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Integrated Hazard Analysis Process for Safety and Security based on SysML
http://doi.org/10.5626/JOK.2019.46.12.1262
In a safety-critical system, an accident may cause harm to people and the environment. Therefore, it is important to thoroughly analyze potential hazards and elicit safety requirements from the concept phase of the system to be developed. Traditionally, component failure has been considered a major hazard. However, in modern systems, software faults and failed interactions among components are other major hazards that must be considered. As wired/wireless network connection plays a major role in recent systems, cyber security has become a major system safety concern. Such threats from hackers should be considered in hazard analysis. In the past, hazard analysis in safety and threat analysis in security have been treated as independent activities. As reports about the common assets and the complementary features of both techniques have been released, combining these two analysis techniques has attracted interest in the safety area. The major focuses of this study involved the analysis techniques and the assessment methodologies. Prior studies that have combined hazard and threat analyses have not provide systematic processes that can be followed by practitioners, which is a critical inconvenience in developing safety critical systems for the field. In this paper, we propose a hazard analysis process based on SAMM that integrates threats related to safety using SysML diagrams. We applied the proposed process to a remote parking assistance system to evaluate its effectiveness.
Identifying Causes of an Accident in STPA Using the Scenario Table
http://doi.org/10.5626/JOK.2019.46.8.787
In recent years, the complexity of safety-critical systems has increased, along with the importance of the software. The software, which has become the control center of the safety system, generates control actions to control the system and then repeats the interaction of controls that re-enters the feedback generated. STPA (System Theoretic Process Analysis) is one of the hazard analysis techniques, and it analyzes the system from the perspective of the interaction of control then uses accident scenarios to identify and analyze the cause of unsafe control actions to derive safe requirements. In order to minimize omissions in the identification stage of STPA accident scenarios associated with safety requirements, in this paper we describe how to incorporate commonalities and complement vulnerabilities in the approaches described in previous studies. To do this, we propose the detailed procedure for identifying accident scenarios and the scenario table to assist them. The ultimately proposed scenario table is identified by applying it to the hazard analysis of the railway diorama system.
Using SysML for the Hazard Analysis Process at Concept Phase of Safety Critical System
http://doi.org/10.5626/JOK.2018.45.7.667
Today, the accident of safety critical system may result in catastrophic harm to people and environments. Therefore, activities designed to ensure safety, such as identifying the hazard and mitigating risks to prevent those accidents, need to be enforced in system development, especially at the concept phase. PHL and PHA can be hired to identify preliminary hazards and to do Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to assess the causes and impacts of those hazards. For developers and safety experts to work together in the lifecycle, those safety activities need to be integrated into the modelling of system development. The common modelling language, SysML, has been recognized as a solution for this purpose and several types of research on this topic have been published. However, not much effort has been made to apply requirements diagram to acquire the visibility and traceability of safety requirements derived from those hazards identified by analyzing SysML diagrams at concept phase, with related artifacts such as implementation and verification. In this paper, we propose a hazard-identification process in which behavior and structure diagrams of SysML could be systematically analyzed. Then the safety requirements were derived to remove or mitigate the identified hazard. To demonstrate the capability of the proposed process, an example of applying it to an elevator system is presented.
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