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Integrated Hazard Analysis Process for Safety and Security based on SysML
http://doi.org/10.5626/JOK.2019.46.12.1262
In a safety-critical system, an accident may cause harm to people and the environment. Therefore, it is important to thoroughly analyze potential hazards and elicit safety requirements from the concept phase of the system to be developed. Traditionally, component failure has been considered a major hazard. However, in modern systems, software faults and failed interactions among components are other major hazards that must be considered. As wired/wireless network connection plays a major role in recent systems, cyber security has become a major system safety concern. Such threats from hackers should be considered in hazard analysis. In the past, hazard analysis in safety and threat analysis in security have been treated as independent activities. As reports about the common assets and the complementary features of both techniques have been released, combining these two analysis techniques has attracted interest in the safety area. The major focuses of this study involved the analysis techniques and the assessment methodologies. Prior studies that have combined hazard and threat analyses have not provide systematic processes that can be followed by practitioners, which is a critical inconvenience in developing safety critical systems for the field. In this paper, we propose a hazard analysis process based on SAMM that integrates threats related to safety using SysML diagrams. We applied the proposed process to a remote parking assistance system to evaluate its effectiveness.
Using SysML for the Hazard Analysis Process at Concept Phase of Safety Critical System
http://doi.org/10.5626/JOK.2018.45.7.667
Today, the accident of safety critical system may result in catastrophic harm to people and environments. Therefore, activities designed to ensure safety, such as identifying the hazard and mitigating risks to prevent those accidents, need to be enforced in system development, especially at the concept phase. PHL and PHA can be hired to identify preliminary hazards and to do Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to assess the causes and impacts of those hazards. For developers and safety experts to work together in the lifecycle, those safety activities need to be integrated into the modelling of system development. The common modelling language, SysML, has been recognized as a solution for this purpose and several types of research on this topic have been published. However, not much effort has been made to apply requirements diagram to acquire the visibility and traceability of safety requirements derived from those hazards identified by analyzing SysML diagrams at concept phase, with related artifacts such as implementation and verification. In this paper, we propose a hazard-identification process in which behavior and structure diagrams of SysML could be systematically analyzed. Then the safety requirements were derived to remove or mitigate the identified hazard. To demonstrate the capability of the proposed process, an example of applying it to an elevator system is presented.
A Method to Specify and Verify Requirements for Safety Critical System
http://doi.org/10.5626/JOK.2017.44.9.893
In safety-critical systems, software defects may have serious consequences. Therefore, defects should be considered during the requirements specification process, which is the first step of a software development lifecycle. Stakeholder requirements that are usually written in natural language are difficult to derived, and there may also be defects due to ambiguity and inaccuracy. To address these issues, we propose a requirement specification method using a standardized Boilerplate and a GSN Model. The Boilerplate is a semi-standard language that follows a predefined format. Due to its ability to provide a consistent representation of the requirements, boilerplate helps stakeholders avoid ambiguities about what they mean and to define the exact meaning of the requirement. Meanwhile, GSN is recognized notation to prepare a Safety Case to prove to authorities that a system is safe. It can be expressed as a functional goal, e.g., Safety Evidence, etc. The proposed study allows an analyst to easily identify a fault from the early stage of the software development lifecycle. The Boilerplate and GSN Model are designed to specify the requirements of safety critical systems and to prove safety conformity through a connection with Safety Evidence. In addition, the proposed approach is also useful to develop secure software by correcting deficiencies in the requirements found during this process.
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